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DISCUSSION DRAFT 
Prepared for the Greater Hartford Chamber of Connnerce's 
Task Force on Tax-Exempt Property 
March 2, 1978 
Professor Richard D. Pomp 
Service Charges on Tax-Exempt Institutions 
A 
The 1972 Governor's Commission on Tax Reform (the Baker Commission), as well 
as other commentators, 1 has recommended that the tax-exempt institutions be 
charged a fee for their consumption of municipal services. This proposal 
attempts to strike a balance between the interests of the municipalities and 
the interests of the tax-exempt institutions. On the one hand, the proposal 
recognizes that the tax-exempts are consumers of locally provided, property-
related services, and thus ought to compensate the municipalities for the 
costs of providing those services. On the other hand, by not subjecting the 
tax-exempt institutions to the regular property tax, the proposal recognizes 
the special status of these organizations. 
A fee levied for the consumption of public services is known as a user, or 
service, charge. User or service charges are hardly novel. A municipality 
that bills property owners for their use of water already imposes a service 
charge, and one that tax-exempt institutions currently pay. Advocates of the 
service charge approach recommend that it be extended to all property-related 
services , such as fire and police protection, refuse collection, sewer services, 
street services , and the like. 
Many economists are in favor of service charges for the same reasons that they 
favor the use of prices in the private market: the minimization of waste by 
consumers and the efficient allocation of resources.2 The provision of public 
services differs from the provision of private services in one important re-
spect, however. As a practical matter, it is difficult to measure the consump-
tion of certain public services, such as fire or police protection, traffic 
control, or road maintenance. Although the supplying of water and the collec-
tion of refuse may lend themselves easily to user charges, no administratively 
feasible method exists for measuring the consumption of most other publicly 
provided services. 3 A user charge based on each tax-exempt's actual consumption 
of public services is therefore likely to be impractical. 
An alternative approach is to approximate a user charge by levying on tax-
exempts that percentage of the mill rate which is attributable to property-
related services . For example, if property-related services constitute one 
third of all local governmental expenditures, then a tax-exempt institution 
would pay a user charge equal to one third of the normal mill rate times its 
assessed value . Using a percentage of the mill rate as a proxy for a user 
charge is obviously a hybrid approach. Because no relationship exists between 
a tax-exempt's consumption of services and the user charge, this approach will 
be viewed by some less as a service charge and more as a thinly disguised 
property tax.4 
Whether viewed as a service charge or as a disguised property tax, this hybrid 
approach may offset one of the inadvertent consequences of the existing system 
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of tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations . Because these organizations do 
not currently pay the property tax, economists argue that they are thereby 
encouraged to overinvest in land and improvements and to hold land idle for 
longer periods of time than would otherwise be true . These effects, if true, 
are hard to justify in land-starved urban areas . Moreover, in times of un-
employment any policy that encourages investment in land instead of in labor 
is questionable. If a service charge reduces these effects, it will be serving 
a positive goal. 
B 
In order to levy a service charge on the assessed value of a tax-exempt's land 
and improvements, accurate data on fair market value is required. Connecticut, 
unlike most other states, requires municipal ities to assess their tax-exempt 
property periodically, but these assessments are presumed by most persons to 
be less accurate than assessments of taxable properties. This presumption is 
entirely reasonable: because exempt properties are not taxed, accuracy in 
their assessment is not crucial, and little effort is therefore spent in 
valuing them. Yet, even if considerable time and effort were devoted to the 
assessment process, valuation problems would still exist since many exempt 
structures are unique or are rarely sold . 
At the heart of the valuation problem is whether the traditional techniques 
for determining fair market value work satisfactorily when applied to tax-
exempt property. In general, three traditional approaches are used in deter-
mining the value of property: the market, the income, and the cost approaches . 5 
Under the market approach, the value of a property is determined by examining 
the sales prices of similar properties that have been sold recently in the 
same geographical area . This method is typical] y used in the valuation of 
residential property, because a sufficient number of similar properties are 
available for comparison. Tax-exempts are not often sold, however, and the 
market approach is therefore unlikely to prove satisfactory in many cases . 
Moreover, the uniqueness of many tax-exempts makes the comparison of sales 
data, even if available, of J ittle value. 
Under the income approach, the appraiser estimates the annual income derived 
from the operation of a building, obtains net income by subtracting operating 
costs, and capitalizes net income to arrive at fair market value. The income 
approach would be satisfactory for valuing an apartment building owned by a 
hospital and rented to its staff, or for valuing university-owned dormitories 
or faculty housing. Most tax-exempt property does not produce income, how-
ever, and the income approach would not be generally applicable. 
Under the cost approach, an estimate is first made of the current costs of 
reproducing the structure being valued. This estimate is then adjusted for 
depreciation and obsolescence. Although the application of the cost approach 
to commercial and industrial property is well-developed, little experience 
exists in applying the method to unique structures, such as the Capitol or 
churches . The cost approach could, conceivably, be modified for use even with 
these types of structures. 
The application of any one of these three valuation techniques to tax-exempt 
property is not likely to be completely satisfactory, though some situations 
~-----l~i •------------------
11 
will be amenable to standard techniques. For example, if a tax-exempt institu-
tion buys property that was previously taxable, an assessment for the purchased 
property will have already been established . In addition, any recent construc-
tion by a tax-exempt can be satisfactorily valued under the cost approach . 
Also, situations in which the tax-exempt structure is similar in function and 
design to a taxable structure, such as an office building that serves as the 
headquarters of a tax-exempt institution, should not pose a severe valuation 
problem. Finally, it should be realized that taxable properties can also 
present problems of "uniqueness II which assessors have had to cope with for a 
long time. Nonetheless, an area requiring further research is whether the 
valuation of tax-exempt properties is a manageable problem.7 
C 
What effect will a service charge have on the operations of a tax-exempt 
institution? An institution's response in the face of the increased cost may 
be to (1) lower the price, quality, or quantity of the goods and services that 
it purchases; (2) raise the price that it charges for its services; (3) increase 
its efforts to solicit funds; (4) draw upon any liquid assets, such as an 
endowment; (5) alter the amount of property it owns; or (6) reduce or el imi-
nate its operations.8 
Not all of these alternatives may be available to every institution. Because 
of the he terogeneity of tax-exempts as a group, predicting how these institu-
tions will respond to a service charge is not possible. The magnitude of the 
service charge, the cost and revenue structure of the institution, its ability 
to pass the charge forward or backward, and its ability to offset the charge 
by soliciting more donations are among the factors that influence an institu-
tion's response.9 It should not be assumed, however, that any increase in the 
price of an institution's services or that any curtailment in its services 
will necessarily be undesirable. For example , if the service charge causes a 
hospital to increase the rents paid by doctors for the use of hospital-
s upplied housing or offices, the actual result may be a progressive redistri-
bution of a municipality's tax burden. At a minimum, however, a service 
charge will inevitably produce a financial strain for certain institutions. 
The service charge approach therefore presents the problem of identifying 
those institutions which merit special re]ief from ~he increased cost. 
One way of responding to this problems is through the use of a "c ircuit breaker." 
In its simplest form, a circuit breaker would provide that the user charge 
could never exceed a certain percentage o[ the institution' s net income, 
defined as gross receipts (including contributions and other voluntary payments), 
less operating expenses . A circuit breaker developed for small institutions 
relying primarily on volunteer help and contributions might be inappropriate, 
however , for a large institution with an endowment f und, such as a hospital or 
a university . Different circuit breakers may have to be developed to take 
into account the net worth of different institutions, the source of their 
funds, the identity of their beneficiaries, and so forth. 
Service Charges--Sunnnary of Issues 
I. How many services can be adequately "priced" under a pure user charge 




II. In order to avoid the problem of pr1c1ng each property-related service, 
an alternative approach is to calculate the percentage of the municipal 
budget which is attributed to such a service. This percentage of the mil] 
rate can then be applied to the assessed value of each tax-exempt institu-
tion. 
A. Advantages 
J . Generates revenue for the municipality. 
2. Offsets the present bias for tax-exempts to overinvest in land 
and to hold land idle. 
B. Problem Areas 
1. Requires the valuation of each tax-exempt institution. Is this 
feasible? 
a. Assessments for tax-exempts already exist, but are they 
satisfactory? 
b. Land, recent improvements, and previously taxed property 
acquired by a tax-exempt may not pose significant valua-
tion problems; but churches, historic buildings, and other 
"unique" structures may require that difficuJ t, subjective 
judgments be made. 
2. What effect will the user charge have on the operations of the 
tax-exempt institutions? 
3. Is there a ny feasible way of identifying those institutions 
which do not have the ability to pay the service charge? Is 
the use of a circuit breaker or similar approach feasible? 
State Payments to Municipalities 
A 
Connecticut currently has a PILOT program (payment in lieu of truces) under 
which the state makes payments to municipalities to partially offset the taxes 
they lose through the presence of state-owned property. The PILOT program 
recognizes the unfairness of forcing certain municipalities to subsidize state 
government. This program could be extended to include private, tax-exempt 
institutions and thereby relieve the burden on those municipalities which 
subsidize another state objective--the encouragement of nonprofit activities. 
A PILOT program that covered these institutions would recognize that their 
benefits are regional and statewide and that their costs should not be borne 
primarily by their host jurisdictions. Compared with a service charge, a 
PILOT program has the advantage of not infringing upon the operations of the 




A PILOT program that reimbursed municipalities for the property tax lost 
because of the presence of private, nonprofit organizations would raise all of 
the valuation difficulties previously discussed, but with one additional and 
significant difference. In the case of a user charge, the tax-exempts and the 
municipalities stand in adversary positions vis-a-vis the assessed value of 
the property. A check is thus provided on the valuation process . But, under 
a PILOT program, the municipality has everything to gain by overvaluing the 
property, since the higher the value of the tax-exempt property, the more the 
municipality would receive from the state. Given that normal assessment 
techniques may not be suitable for the valuation of tax-exempt property, the 
state would find it difficult to police the figures supplied by the munici-
palities.11 A PILOT program thus places the state in the position of making 
payments on the basis of controversial assessments that can be easily manipu-
lated by the municipalities. 
One way of mitigating this prob]em is to eliminate the hard-to-value properties 
from the PILOT program. For example, payments could be made on the basis of 
the fair market value of only the land owned by the tax-exempts, on the theory 
(which may not prove to be true in all cases) that the land is easier and less 
controversial to value than a tax-exempt's improvements. In addition, payments 
could be made for taxable property that had been recently acquired by a tax-
exempt, because an accurate valuation of such property would already exist. 
Similarly, PILOT payments could be made for any recent improvements, since the 
cost of such improvements would be an accurate measure of their fair market 
value. Finally, PILOT payments could be based on the existing assessments of 
tax-exempt property, 12 which the municipalities are required to make under 
state law. Unless all future payments were based on existing assessments 
(which could be adjusted for inflation), however, the valuation problem would 
still arise at some point in the future.13 
The valuation problem could be avoided by adopting a relatively simple and 
objective formula as the basis for PILOT payments--a formula based on square 
footage. The square footage formula would express the relationship between 
the cost of municipal services and the square feet of land and improvements in 
the municipality. By dividing the property tax revenue by the square feet of 
land and improvements, a mill rate per square foot could be derived. This 
figure would then be multiplied by the amount of square feet that any tax-
exempt property occupies in order to obtain the PILOT payment. Admittedly, 
such a formula is arbitrary to the extent that municipal costs are not di-
rectly related to square footage. Although this criticism may prevent the 
formula from serving as the basis of a service charge, which would be paid by 
the institution itself, the formula is certainly workable as the foundation 
for a PILOT program. In reality, the formula may not be any more arbitrary as 
a basis for PILOT payments than are subjective and elusive valuations of tax-
exempt property.14 
B 
The final question concerns the distribution of PILOT funds. Under either a 
square footage formula or an assessed valuation approach, aid can be channeled 
only to those jurisdictions which have a disproportionate amount of tax-exempt 
property. One alternative is to make payments only to municipalities whose 
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tax-exempt property (whether measured by square footage or market value) 
exceeds the statewide average. The PILOT payment could then be a function of 
the difference between the statewide average and the municipality's figure. 
Another alternative would be to make payments only to municipalities whose 
tax-exempt property exceeds a certain percentage of their taxable grand list. 
Numerous variations of these alternatives are possible, of course. 
Drawing a distinction among jurisdictions on the basis of their amount of tax-
exempt property would separate suburban and rural areas from urban areas. 
This distinction can be defended by focusing on the types of tax-exempt insti-
tutions likely to be found in these different areas. In suburban and rural 
areas, the tax-exempt institutions typically serve a local constituency; 
institutions located in the city, however, more commonly serve a regional and, 
in some cases, a statewide constituency . State PILOT payments to jurisdictions 
having a greater than average amount of tax-exempt property would reflect the 
spillover in benefits. The cost of the PILOT program would therefore be 
shared, to some degree, by those who enjoy the services of the institutions. 
State Payments to Municipalities--Summary of Issues 
I. Advantages 
A. Does not interfere with the operations of the tax-exempts. 
B. Distributes the costs of the exemption among residents of the state. 
II. Problem Areas 
A. Requires the valuation of the tax-exempts. Is this feasible ? 
Valuation of the institutions raises the same issues as a user 
charge, with one additional and significant problem. Under a PILOT 
program, the tax-exempts have no incentive to contest their assess-
ments. Therefore, no check exists on a municipality's incentive to 
overassess the tax-exempts in order to obtain larger PILOT payments . 
Can the state police this problem? 
1. Can the valuation morass be avoided by using a square footage 
formula, or a similar approach? 
III. Which Municipalities Will Receive PILOT Payments? 
A. All municipalities? 
B. Only jurisdictions having an amount of tax-exempt property in excess 
of the statewide average? 
C. Only jurisdictions having an amount of tax-exempt property in excess 
of a certain percentage of their taxable grand list? 
Acreage, Market Value, and Other Limitations on the Exemption 
Other means of balancing the interests of the tax-exempts with the interests 
of the municipalities involve the imposition of various ceiling or similar 
limitations on the exemption . For example, a time period could be provided 
beyond which the exemption would be phased out. The exemption might be 
granted for the first five years in an organization's life and phased out 
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thereafter. A time limitation would enable new organizations to get started 
without the burden of the property tax and, at the same time, would recognize 
the host jurisdiction ' s interest in not being burdened with a perpetual ex-
emption. If the time period is sufficient , the organization wiJ 1 be able to 
plan for the eventual phasing out of the exemption. Other approaches would be 
to limit the number of acres of land which could qualify for the exemption, to 
place a ceiling on the fair market value of property that can be exempt, or to 
phase in the exemption whenever taxable property is removed from the grand 
list by a tax-exempt. As is true with respect to any approach that imposes 
increased costs on the tax-exempts, relief may have to be provided for those 
institutions which are unable to bear the additional financial burden imposed 
by a curtailment of the exemption. 
Research is underway to determine the extent to which these J imi ts are used by 
other states . Preliminary findings indicate that ceilings on acreage and fair 
market value are used by some states in limited circumstances. 
Municipal Permission for Tax-Exempts To Acquire Taxable Property 
Another approach would be to require a municipality's permission before any 
taxable property could be acquired for a tax-exempt purpose. The municipality 
would thus be given the power to control the erosion of its tax base, a power 
similar to the power that it now possesses to grant property tax exemptions in 
order to attract new industrial and conunercial property. 
Although our research has not yet uncovered any state that has granted this 
authority to its municipalities, three sets of potential problems can be 
identified which need further study . First, from the state's perspective, the 
cities represent the optimum location for many kinds of tax-exempts. The 
cities are the administrative, cultural, medical, and educational centers for 
both their surrounding regions and the state. Services offered by nonprofit 
institutions located in urban areas are accessible to the greatest number of 
persons. The state ' s interest in having an optimum distribution of these 
services thus conflicts with a municipality's interest in restricting the 
expansion of the tax-exempts . Limiting a municipality's power to deny the 
expansion of a tax-exempt may therefore be necessary in order to ensure that 
the state's interests are not significantly undermined. Second, controls may 
be required so that a tax-exempt does not simply play one jurisdiction off 
against another in an attempt to nullify each municipa]ity's power. Third, 
the state would have to provide certain guidelines for the exercise of the 
municipality's power if it is to guarantee that all organizations are treated 
fairly and equally. 
Review of the Statutory Definition of Tax-Exempt Property 
No significant legislative changes have recently been made in the state's 
definition of those activities which qualify for the tax exemption. The 
rec~urse of the towns has been to institute litigation, and the task of re-
fining the definition and of resolving the inevitable ambiguities in the law 
has therefore fallen onto the courts. The legislature appears indifferent 
whether the law developed by the courts comports with current views on the 
policy underlying the granting of the exemption . 
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Perhaps the source of the state's indifference can be identified. Under the 
present system, the municipalities--not the state-- bear the cost of the 
exemption; consequently, the state has little direct financial interest in 
maintaining close vigilance over the deve]opment of the law. A PILOT program 
for tax-exempts would provide an incentive for the state to examine the 
present range of uses and activities that qualify for the exemption. Whether 
or not a PILOT program is adopted, however, an evaluation of existing law is 
appropriate. Research is currently being conducted to determine the scope of 
existing tax exemptions. This research will also examine the definition of 
tax-exempt activities which is used for federal income tax purposes to see 
whether some correlation between the state and the federal definitions is 
possible. 15 
The Church/State Issue 
In contrast to all the other tax-exempt institutions covered by this discussion 
draft, churches pose a special set of constitutional problems. The first 
amendment prohibits laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof." In a sense, the first amendment acts as a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, any state policy that benefits religion 
is likely to be challenged by opponents as an impermissible establishment of 
religion. On the other hand, those who support the policy are likely to argue 
that a failure to provide the benefit places an unconstitutional burden on the 
free exercise of religion. The "damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you- don't" natur e 
of the dilemma is readily apparent. 
Research is needed to evaluate the constitutional issues presented by the 
following questions: 
1. Could the state make PILOT payments to municipalities which are 
based on either the value or the square footage of church property? 
Conversely, could church property be excluded from a PILOT program? 
2. Could a service charge based on that percentage of the mill rate 
which represents property-related services be applied t o churches? 
Conversely, could churches be exempted from a service charge that is 
applied to all other tax-exempts? 
3. Could a law under which a municipality's permission were r equired 
before a tax-exempt institution could expand its land holdings be 
applied to churches? Conversely, could churches be exempt f r om 
requiring the municipality ' s permission? 
4. Could various limits on the property tax exemption (for example, 
the first 50 acres of land or the first $100,000 of value) be 
applied to churches? Conversely, could churches be exempt from such 
limits if they were applied to all other tax-exempts? 




lsee, e.g . , Quigley and Schmenner, Property Tax Exemption and Public 
Policy, 23 Public Policy 259, 278 (1975). 
2see, e.g . , Kafoglis, "Local Service Charges: Theory and Practice, " 
in Johnson (ed . ), State and Local Tax Problems (Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1969~Netzer,User Charge Revenue in Connecticut: 
Practice and Prospects (Connecticut State Revenue Task Force, 1970). 
3Even if it were possible to develop a pricing mechanism for a wider 
range of municipal services, other difficulties remain. Requiring 
payment for services that are meant to be redistributive in nature 
(e.g., welfare) is obviously counter-productive. Furthermore, there 
are many services, such as education, which are purposely made avail-
able to all consumers regardless of their ability to pay. Also, the 
Internal Revenue Code does not allow a deduction for service charges 
(unless business related) but does allow a deduction for property 
taxes . The federal income tax thus contains an inducement for muni-
cipalities to "bill" for services through the property tax, rather 
than utilizing service charges. 
4If this approach is viewed as a service charge, will an adjustment be 
made for tax-exempts that have their own private security guards or 
who pay for the private collection of refuse? If viewed as a property 
tax, will this approach violate the property tax immunity found in the 
charter of a number of private colleges and universities (e . g., Yale, 
Trinity, and Wesleyan)? 
Not only is there no precise way to link an institution's consumption 
of services with the amount called a service c harge, but there is the 
additional problem that so-called property-related services also 
benefit individuals qua individuals rather than qua property owners . 
For example, police services protect individuals as well as their real 
and personal property. No method exists for separating the total 
amount spent on police protection into these components . Classifying 
all of the cos ts for police protection as a property-related service 
is thus an oversimplification. 
5see G. Wassall, Tax-Exempt Property: A Case Study 44 (John C. 
Lincoln Institute, 1974). 
6Assessment Valuation Manual, Volume 4 (Ontario Ministry of Revenue, 
1972) . 
7For example, could the amount of fire insurance coverage carried by 
the institution provide an acceptable figure for valuation purposes? 
8G. Wassall, Tax-Exempt Property: A Case Study of Hartford, 
Connecticut 53 (John C. Lincoln Institute, 1974). 
9The problem of adjusting to a service charge would be l ess severe if 
the charge were phased in over a period of years. 
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lOFederal PILOT programs also exist with respect to properties owned 
by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Farmers Horne Administration, and some forest lands. 
llquery whether the amount of fire insurance coverage carried by the 
institution could provide an acceptable figure that would help reduce 
disagreement over valuation. 
12These valuations may aJready be overinflated, however, by a mun1c1-
pality wishing to dramatize the erosion of its grand list by tax-
exempts, or by a municipality having the foresight to anticipate the 
eventual enactment of a PILOT program. 
lJTo the extent the PILOT payinents arc based on only a small percentage 
o( the value of the municipality ' s tax-exempt property, or limited in 
total amount by a low cap, the valuation problem becomes less signif-
icant. 
14The square footage formuJa can also be refined to adapt to special 
categories of property. Take the case of undeveloped land. Because 
undeveloped land arguably consumes fewer municipal services than 
improved land, it may be viewed as unfair to divide the total property 
tax levy by a square footage figure that includes raw land. Instead, 
some percentage of the property tax levy, perhaps measured only by 
property related services (similar to the service charge approach) can 
be used. A levy per square foot of undeveloped land could thus be 
derived which would then be used as the basis of the PILOT payment. 
This same approach could be extended to other categories of property. 
lSEven if the definitions were to remain unrelated, some coordination 
between the IRS and the state is still possible . For example, the IRS 
could notify the state whenever the federal tax-exempt status of a 
Connecticut organization has been either revoked or denied. It would 
seem appropriate that a federal denial or revocation of tax-exempt 
status should trigger a re-examination of the organization ' s property 
tax exemption. 
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